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Abstract: 
BACKGROUND: This article reports on an investigation of the views of IVF couples 
asked to donate fresh embryos for research and adds to debates on: the acceptability 
of human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research; the moral status of the human 
embryo, and on embryo donation for research.  
 
METHODS: A hypothesis-generating design was followed. All IVF couples in one UK 
clinic who were asked to donate embryos in one year were contacted six weeks after 
their pregnancy result. Forty four couples were interviewed in depth.  
 
RESULTS:  Interviewees were preoccupied with IVF treatment and the request to 
donate was a secondary consideration. They used a complex and dynamic system of 
embryo classification. Initially all embryos were important but then their focus shifted 
to those that had most potential to produce a baby. At that point, ‘other’ embryos 
were less important though they later realise that they did not know what happened to 
them. Guessing that these embryos went to research, interviewees preferred not to 
contemplate what that might entail. The embryos that caused interviewees most 
concern were good quality embryos that might have produced a baby but went to 
research instead. ‘The’ embryo, the morally laden, but abstract, entity, did not play a 
central role in their decision making.  
 
CONCLUSIONS: This study, despite missing those who refuse to donate embryos, 
suggests that debates on embryo donation for hESC research should include the views 
of embryo donors and should consider the social, as well as the moral, status of the 
human embryo. 
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Introduction 
There has been much debate on the moral status of the human embryo (Beyleveld, 
2008; McLean, 2008) and on the acceptability of deriving stem cells from human 
embryos, since this results in the destruction of those embryos (McLaren, 2001; de 
Wert and Mummery, 2003; ASRM Ethics Committee, 2002). We aim to add new 
considerations to these debates by presenting data from a study investigating the 
views, values and experiences of couples undergoing IVF who were asked to donate
1
 
fresh embryos for human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research.  
Our central research question was, „What is the repertoire of perceptions, concerns 
and views considered by couples who have been asked to donate their embryos for 
research, as part of the process of deciding whether to donate?‟. This study builds on 
an earlier investigation in the same clinic which indicated broad patterns of donor 
characteristics (Choudhary et al., 2004). However that study did not talk directly to 
the IVF patients about their reasons for donating. The study reported here addresses 
that gap. 
2
 
 
Even though IVF patients might be assumed to attach particular value to embryos, 
since they have strived so hard to acquire them, they are still a relatively neglected 
constituency in debates about embryo donation (Haimes and Luce, 2006). Knowledge 
about their views and experiences contributes to debates about whether it is ethically 
justifiable to ask them to donate embryos: in particular, to donate fresh embryos 
during their IVF treatment. It is important for policymakers, researchers and 
practitioners to know whether the potential practical gains from hESC research are 
achieved at social and ethical costs to embryo donors and, if so, what those costs 
might be. Equally, evidence of good practice in embryo donation needs to be 
identified so that it might be replicated elsewhere. 
 
 
Methods 
This research was conducted in one UK clinic. Since little was known about patients‟ 
experiences of the request for fresh embryos, a hypothesis-generating, rather than 
testing, design (based on inductive principles) was followed. We sampled for 
maximum variation of ideas and perceptions (i.e. heterogeneity sampling, a sub-
category of purposive sampling), with the aim of recruiting sufficient numbers to 
allow thematic saturation to be reached (Silverman 2001,pp250-4). All couples 
undergoing IVF treatment over approximately 10 months in 2005-6 who were asked 
to donate embryos for a range of studies were contacted approximately six weeks 
after receiving their pregnancy result, to request their participation in a social science 
interview; a total of 399 requests. Forty six consent forms agreeing to participate were 
returned to the authors and, because one couple changed their minds and one couple 
could not find a suitable time, 44 interviews were conducted; an 11% response rate. 
Reasons for non-participation were impossible to judge directly as the authors only 
had contact with potential participants after they had completed a consent form; this 
recruitment system was adopted to protect patient confidentiality. A semi-structured 
interview format was used enabling interviewees to: (i) shape the discussion in ways 
relevant to their experience; (ii) express views in their own words and thus attach a 
                                                 
1
 We are following current conventions by using the language of „donation‟. However, there is a strong 
case for using the more neutral language of „provision‟ (Haimes, 2008) 
2
 The clinic assisted with access to patients for our social science study but we followed previous 
patterns of collaboration in ensuring full ethical and analytical independence from the clinical team. 
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variety of meanings to what is superficially the 'same' experience or entity; (iii) 
broaden the scope of the research by raising topics not previously considered; (iv) 
challenge others' assumptions. Broad sets of questions covered the following areas: 
interviewees‟ demographic details; how they first heard about donating embryos and 
how they made their decisions; their views of the consent processes; their 
understandings and views of stem cell research; any previous knowledge or 
involvement in embryo experimentation; their knowledge of regulation of fertility 
treatment and hESC science, and their wider awareness of social and ethical issues in 
this area. All interviews were fully transcribed. Through the hermeneutic analysis of 
transcripts, using constant comparison and category building procedures, major 
themes in interviewees‟ views were identified. This was followed by category 
mapping and deviant case analysis, to allow inductive theorising (Silverman, 2001).  
 
 
Results 
Thirty couples had had either one (14 couples) or two (16 couples) cycles of 
treatment; thirteen couples had had three or more cycles; one couple was unsure how 
many cycles they had had. Twenty seven couples reported that they thought they had 
consented to donate fresh embryos to all the hESC research projects in all their cycles 
of treatment; another three couples consented to donate to all projects though not in 
all their cycles; two couples declined to consent to donate embryos to any of the 
studies; another ten couples consented to donate to some though not all studies; two 
couples were unsure if they had consented to donate embryos.  
Five major themes emerged: (i) interviewees‟ views on embryos; (ii) why and how 
they made the decision to donate or to refuse; (iii) their evaluations of the consent 
process; (iv) their understandings of the research projects they were being asked to 
donate to, and finally, as a cross-cutting theme, (v) the socio-medical context of IVF 
in which they were asked to donate their embryos. This article focuses on the first 
theme.  
 
Analysis of interviewees‟ views on embryos reveals five interwoven sub-themes: (i) 
the experiential lens of IVF through which they viewed the request to donate „spare‟ 
fresh embryos, given their goal of having a baby; (ii) their deliberations over whether 
the embryo is the same as a baby; (iii) their concerns over the number and quality of 
eggs and embryos that they produced through IVF and the options for how to use 
these. We have termed these considerations the „calculus of conception‟ to reflect the 
persistent mental arithmetic that couples have to perform when calculating the 
possible combinations of outcomes of treatment; (iv) their views on the opportunity to 
see the embryos selected for transfer, on a screen, prior to transfer; (v) how they 
spoke about, and compared, the transferred and non-transferred embryos.  
The first and second sub-themes acted as primary reference points throughout the 
interviews and framed almost everything else interviewees said; we therefore draw 
attention to this framing here. We have labelled this feature of their discourse „baby 
talk‟ (Haimes et al., 2008). Though not unexpected, this framing needs to be made 
explicit, given (a) the benefits of hearing from potential donors themselves about their 
priorities, and (b) concerns over the difficulty of acquiring embryos (and eggs) for 
hESC and other research. Since we deliberately did not ask interviewees directly 
about associations between embryos and babies the fact that „baby talk‟ emerged 
spontaneously is a testimony to its strength in framing interviewees‟ views. 
Haimes and Taylor 2009 
Page 4 of 17 
 
 
Interviewees saw themselves, first and foremost, as „IVF patients‟ not „embryo 
donors‟.  
 
In the description of the findings that follows we argue that insight into how and why 
decisions are made, and the impact of those decisions, can assist the identification of 
ethically robust ways of improving donation rates, if IVF donation continues to be 
seen as an appropriate way to source such tissue. However, the highlighting of 
patients‟ priorities should not be taken as another reference to the „desperateness‟ of 
IVF patients who are seen as being so focussed on babies that they are deemed 
incapable of making rational observations and choices beyond that of IVF itself 
(Franklin, 1990). Rather it is a reminder that, from their point of view, the research is 
just another consideration (of many) encountered on the way to achieving their goal. 
This might also explain the uncertainty about which studies they agreed to donate to, 
in which cycle of treatment. That which is vitally important to researchers, regulators 
and some clinicians (the acquisition of embryos for hESC research), is (initially at 
least) of only secondary importance to the IVF patients. This point was made 
explicitly by at least 10 couples. 
 
Each sub-theme sheds light on how interviewees speak and think about, and act 
towards, „the embryo‟ and shows just how complex and variable these understandings 
of the embryo are, in the IVF clinic, at the interface of IVF treatment and hESC 
research (Svendsen and Koch, 2008; Franklin, S, 2006).  
 
(i) The priority is to have a baby: 
The following brief extracts provide evidence of where interviewees‟ focus lay. As 
one interviewee said, „the sole purpose‟ is „to have a baby … they‟re not here to be 
part of a medical experiment, they‟re here because they want a baby … obviously 
you‟re not just thinking about the research, you‟re thinking about the whole concept 
of the treatment that you‟re going to start and what that‟s going to mean to your life 
… [In IVF] you‟re consciously thinking, “I‟m going to have to have all these 
injections …”, so I think you have a lot more on your mind that‟s probably distracting 
you away from the paperwork that says “this research we‟re going to do will be 
looking at this and that”. So some people might just think, “that really doesn‟t involve 
me personally, I‟ll sign that and then think about the consequences afterwards” „ 
(IVF16:430-551). Interviewees apologetically referred to their „selfishness‟ or 
„greed‟. Several said they were happy to donate to research as long as they had first 
selection of the embryos and only those not useable for their treatment went to 
research. Whilst it would be „wonderful‟ to cure Parkinson‟s, „really our priority is 
just to have a baby‟ (IVF28:1005-29). These views are summed up by one 
interviewee, ‟IVF … is such a big thing anyway, especially if it‟s your first time. 
[Research is] not really your priority. It sounds selfish but that‟s the way people think 
… To be honest I don‟t think I read the third set of information‟ (IVF35:493-532). 
 
(ii) Embryos and babies:  
In the IVF context, the association between embryos and babies is not unexpected. 
However, the data below show that they were not seen by interviewees as simplistic 
equivalents. 
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Therefore „baby talk‟ is not meant to suggest that interviewees thought embryos were 
babies; rather, „baby talk‟ framed patients‟ deliberations, being the initial and most 
prominent reference point from which other distinctions developed.  
 
One woman said: „… I think in a way an embryo is still a baby. I still think of it as a 
baby right from day one‟. However the embryo they donated for research was „unused 
material, stuff that can‟t be put back in us for whatever reason, „cos they don‟t think 
it‟s good enough‟ (IVF 4:885-990). Thus the first device she employs to explain her 
views is to draw a comparison between embryos and babies but equally, and at the 
same time, embryos can be „stuff‟. 
 
Two broad clusters of views emerged from the interviews. The first cluster considers 
the possibility that the embryo is a baby or could be regarded as a baby, actually or in 
its immediate potential. One couple described their first reaction at being asked to 
donate embryos as „we didn‟t want anybody to have our babies [laughs], our 
embryos‟ (IVF35:229-232). The second cluster encapsulates assertions that the 
embryo is clearly not a baby and is „just a ball of cells‟ (IVF5:215-228), „a blob‟ 
(IVF12: 312-349), „it‟s this tiny little dot‟ (IVF17:627-639). However, these 
interviewees then debated whether the embryo, if not a baby, is nonetheless a living 
entity. „At what point does a blob, or speck of cells, divided cells, become a person? 
Or when does it become capable of thought?‟ (IVF39:1144-1231).  
 
These two positions do not represent hard and fast groupings to which interviewees 
could be easily allocated, however; rather, they were clusters of considerations which 
they voiced as they, for the most part, struggled to reach a settled view. For example, 
one interviewee asserted that the embryo is not a baby but expressed the ambivalence 
and discipline that need to accompany this stance:  „You‟ve just got to get past the 
fact that [pause] and not think of the egg and the embryo in terms of a child. You‟ve 
got to still think of it as an egg and an embryo, which is what in fact it is … Unless 
it‟s planted inside the womb it‟s never going to develop into a child and I think 
you‟ve got to basically remember that it‟s still an embryo and an egg. (IVF7:573-
580). These data indicate how interviewees oriented themselves towards the request 
and towards the „entity‟ they were asked to donate.  
 
(iii) The „calculus of conception‟ 
We use this phrase to convey the mental arithmetic that patients endlessly perform to 
calculate their chances of achieving a baby from the number of follicles, eggs, 
fertilised eggs, cells and embryos they have succeeded in producing. The calculations 
gain complexity by considerations of quality („it‟s drummed into you, it‟s quality, not 
quantity that counts‟ (IVF40:833-52)) and by the choices between different uses of 
these entities. The request to donate embryos complicated these calculations for 
interviewees. 
 
Interviewees knew that embryos could be: (a) transferred back to the woman; (b) 
frozen (though this clinic has a longstanding policy, that predates involvement with 
hESC research, of caution towards freezing embryos, concerned this gives couples 
false hopes about future outcomes, given the likely deterioration on thawing, and also 
because of the expense of freezing. The clinic only freezes embryos if there are four 
or more good quality ones left after embryo transfer); (c) donated to other couples for 
treatment (though only one of the 44 couples interviewed had agreed to donate eggs 
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for the treatment of others, the rest were all less keen on this, from fear that this could 
result in someone else having „their‟ baby); (d) donated for research; or (e) disposed 
of without further use.  
 
However, interviewees reported a disparity in what they wanted to do and what 
actually happened: almost all would have preferred a combination of transferring two 
embryos and freezing the rest (to alleviate, financially, physically, emotionally, as 
they saw it, the next cycle of IVF). They remained puzzled, at the time of interview, 
that they themselves turned out not to meet the dual quantity-quality criteria 
(especially those who had produced a large number of eggs or embryos). Reactions 
ranged in intensity. One woman sounded resigned to the fact that she had produced 
„quite a lot of eggs‟ but only four good embryos (IVF7:185-221). Another though was 
„shocked‟ that having produced 26 eggs, 17 of which had fertilised, she had no 
embryos available for freezing: „that was quite a smack in the face‟ (IVF2:186-228).  
 
This type of disappointment is not unusual in IVF, but some interviewees questioned 
whether these results were related to the research context (see below). They also 
remained unclear about how the judgement had been made about what to do with the 
embryos. There was some uncertainty about how the quality of embryos was judged 
and how this grading affected decisions about freezing or using in research. Again, 
many (at least 15 couples) said that they were not told much or anything at this stage 
and this had left them puzzled. They were unclear whether embryos not good enough 
for transfer or freezing were still good enough for research. 
 
One person expressed these uncertainties: „We were always told that it would be ones 
unsuitable to be transferred that would be used, they would never use perfect ones [for 
research] … Fourteen fertilized, so we were really, really optimistic…when it came to 
embryo transfer they said they were going to transfer two and I said, “were there any 
to be frozen for another cycle for us?” and they said, “no”, and that was the only 
answer we got. So I don‟t know whether that was below the four because I believe it‟s 
got be four perfect ones, then they‟ll go ahead and freeze them … But they said there 
was none to be frozen. So maybe there were one or two perfect ones used for research 
that they couldn‟t use in the freezing process. I‟ve no idea.‟ It is important to add that 
this person immediately said, „I understood at the time that things would happen that 
way and I understood fully‟ (IVF1:439-482). However, she is clearly indicating that 
there was ambiguity in what was said or in how she understood it.  
 
Those expressing uncertainty also said they felt reluctant to ask for further 
information, though it is not clear what inhibited them (especially in light of other 
remarks about the high quality of service provided by the clinic). It might have been 
that at the time they were so focused on the transferred embryos that they did not 
consider these other aspects until later (see below). This is a further indication that the 
IVF process is so consuming of attention and energies that many aspects of the 
decisions taken did not occur to patients until after the cycle had been completed.  
 
(iv) Seeing embryos prior to transfer  
Patients are routinely given the opportunity to see the embryos about to be transferred 
back to the woman, on a screen beforehand. The majority of couples (34 cases) took 
this opportunity and found it positive and exciting. Many (19 cases) spoke about the 
shape and number of cells and their sense that at long last something was happening 
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(17 cases). However the experience encouraged interviewees to associate the seen 
embryos with possible future children in stronger terms than previously and this led to 
mixed emotions. 
 
One woman described how her views of the embryo, and ideas around life itself, were 
affected by the experience: „I think I‟ve become far more fascinated by it … when 
you see five cells on a screen, that‟s quite a strange sensation … I‟ve suddenly got a 
lot more respect for how hardy life is. I always imagined before we started the 
treatment that the eggs and embryos were far more delicate than I now think they are 
… I feel unlucky that I‟ve had to go through the treatment but I also [feel] very 
privileged that I‟ve potentially, I‟ve seen my child at five cells which most people just 
don‟t get the chance to do‟ (IVF11:653-97). 
 
At least nine couples decided they did not want to see the embryos in any cycle and 
two said they would not look on another cycle. The decision though is not easy: „… 
the second time my husband wanted to see them again and I refused so I had to cover 
my eyes … I felt that because I‟d looked at them I‟d developed a relationship [starts 
crying] and the second time I just thought, “well, I won‟t look at them and then I 
won‟t think about them”, but you do [long pause] Sorry, it‟s dragging up loads of 
memories [crying]…But even though you haven‟t seen the rest of your embryos I still 
feel like I‟ve lost, you know, however many babies …‟ (IVF23:590-633).  
 
For another couple, though, the failure to sustain a pregnancy was not a reason for not 
seeing the embryos in the next cycle: „we still really wanted to see them … you‟ve got 
to think its going to work, you [would] want to have seen them at that stage. But I do 
think it makes it harder‟ (IVF 40:1092-1106). Once again the imagined child is 
evident: if the treatment had worked, they would have regretted not seeing the child at 
that early stage.  
 
Of those who were pregnant, one couple said they wished they had taken a 
photograph, „so we could say to our child, “this was you when you were four cells” 
[all laugh].‟ (IVF1:833-77). Another couple referred to their child from a previous 
cycle when they had also seen the embryos, „‟we saw her, we don‟t know which one 
was her at this early stage … she was being naughty then!‟ (IVF22:550-61). They 
imbue the embryos with the child‟s biography and attributes from this point. Those 
who were not pregnant tended to have the same conversation with the hypothetical 
child as those above were having with the actual child, „you do think that one day it 
would be a nice story if you got pregnant to say to your child, “I‟ve seen you when 
you were just four cells big”‟ (IVF20:723-50).  
 
As we have seen, it was in anticipation of a sense of loss that some couples chose not 
to see the embryos. However, even those who did not feel the loss as a miscarriage 
nonetheless used the same frame of reference: „they put them back in and then I think 
it‟s ten days later you come and get a blood test to see whether they‟ve taken and they 
hadn‟t, obviously. But I never thought that I‟d lost two babies‟ (IVF6:377-96). Once 
again the association between embryos and babies is such that these are the terms in 
which claims that „embryos-are-not-babies‟ have to be explained. 
 
Within the context of having agreed to donate to research, the relationship to a 
projected child could be troubling, on later reflection. Seeing the embryo on the 
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screen, ‟turns it into a little person…which is fine, but when you‟re talking about 
consenting for stem cells [laughs] and then, you‟re seeing these embryos and you can 
see the cells jiggling around, you think, “well …”. But by that time you‟ve filled the 
forms in, but of course you remember that for the next time.‟ (IVF9:1026-37).  
 
(v) Comparing the transferred and non-transferred embryos: 
Given the impact of seeing (or deciding not to see) the embryos that were to be 
transferred, it is fruitful to compare interviewees‟ views on these embryos with the 
non-transferred (n-t) ones. This provides insight into their views on embryos in 
general (do all embryos have the same social and moral value, whatever their usage or 
destiny?) and insight into how they view the embryos that they have donated for 
research (do these have a different social or moral value, given their particular destiny 
or presumed lesser quality?). The data suggest that interviewees had little chance to 
make such comparisons during the IVF process but that later reflection raised further 
questions for them. 
 
(a) Uncertainty over destiny of n-t embryos.  Interviewees were asked whether they 
knew what had happened to the embryos that were not transferred. Since most 
interviewees had few or no embryos frozen this discussion tended to centre round 
their knowledge about the other possible destinies for the embryos. Almost all 42 
couples who consented to donate to research were unsure whether this had been acted 
on or even if the embryos were good enough for research. Several described being too 
preoccupied with the treatment and the outcome of the embryo transfer to think about 
the other embryos at that time: „I can‟t remember whether anybody said to me they 
were good enough to be used or not, or whether I asked, because at the time, I was 
just, “wow, what‟s going on?” …I didn‟t stop and think, it wasn‟t high on my list of 
priorities. But if they were used then that doesn‟t worry me‟ (IVF6:415-40). 
 
(b)  Did they compare transferred and n-t embryos?  Further aspects of interviewees‟ 
views of the relationship between transferred and non-transferred embryos became 
apparent when they were asked directly whether they compared the two, and if so, 
how. One woman said, ‟I just feel a sense of loss … I think at the time it‟s enormous, 
but now I don‟t try to think about that. That‟s probably why you get upset when you 
do start to talk about it. But I think you‟d go mad if you did think about eleven babies 
that you could possibly have had and you haven‟t got one. And so it‟s scary …‟ When 
asked how she thought about that loss in relation to the decision to donate she replied, 
„it‟s a case of, “if I can‟t have them then nobody else is going to have them”, to give 
to other couples, but in terms of research then if they‟re no good to me then hopefully 
they might be good in some other sense. So that‟s how I rationalise it.‟ (IVF23:720-
39). This theme of „trying not to think‟ is not uncommon, though expressed in 
different ways at different points in the interviews. Another woman said, „I didn‟t 
think about the ones that weren‟t transferred at all [long pause]. I think I possibly did 
the first cycle, I think I did and so I purposely don‟t any more [laughs]…I think it gets 
a little bit easier with each cycle…‟ (IVF15:580-603). Again there is a sense of a 
struggle between how much these experiences actually mean and how much they 
ought to mean, and uncertainty about whether they are being given too great or too 
little significance. 
 
(c)  How were embryos selected?  Consideration of the non-transferred embryos 
entailed reflection on how embryos were selected. Some were happy with the 
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decision-making process: „That was the thing that was made clear at the start. They 
would only use for research what couldn‟t viably be used for us. So I never ever 
attached myself to the other ones…at no point did we say, “Oh I wonder if any of the 
others could have [worked]”. We always knew that the two best ones went in and the 
rest just weren‟t suitable‟ (IVF29:702-43). This group of, approximately eight, 
interviewees were not particularly concerned either about the destiny of their non-
transferred embryos (beyond their disappointment that not more were frozen) or what 
happened to them once they got there. They were preoccupied with their treatment 
and they had little detailed understanding of the physical or social context of the 
research to which they were donating.  
 
Others questioned how the clinic picked the ones to be transferred: „she said that they 
would only pick the ones that are grade one but if there are nine grade ones, I did 
wonder how did they choose this one and not the other one…I wish I‟d had them 
all…for me life starts at conception so I still felt that was life really, even if they 
weren‟t going to be implanted‟. Her partner commented, „you just have to trust that 
they‟re experienced and they know which ones have a better chance…I do think life 
starts at conception but at the same time if you transfer all nine of them then most will 
not survive anyway, you‟re better off implanting the ones that are going to survive‟. 
(IVF32:539-609). Another woman said, „they‟ve probably thrown some good ones 
away, you don‟t know‟ (IVF35:1901-22) 
 
(d)  The troubling third embryo.  This possibility was particularly troubling for a 
significant sub-set of interviewees who had more than two top quality embryos but 
not enough to have any frozen in this clinic. We refer to these as the „troubling third 
embryo‟ (which is a shorthand as some couples could have one, two or three top 
quality embryos that are neither transferred nor frozen so this phrase includes the 
„troubling fourth and fifth embryo‟ too). This is where the difficulty of satisfying 
quality and quantity criteria affects couples most. There is far less acceptance or 
resignation about these embryos than for the other non-transferred embryos discussed 
so far. At least eleven couples who were clear that they had at least one top quality 
embryo that was neither transferred nor frozen, struggled with this. One woman who 
thought she had good quality embryos that were not transferred said she had produced 
„six really good quality and we had two go back‟, so „the four, they were the leftovers 
weren‟t they. They‟ll have had some really good poke abouts at them. They‟ll have 
dug all sorts [out] of them if they were good quality ones…well, I signed the form, I 
signed the form, that was [my] decision to make [short pause]. But it‟s the good ones 
that upset me, the four little good ones‟ (IVF18:1718-1741). Another said about the 
third embryo that could not be frozen, „I would like to know what other people think, 
people who are getting more because you can‟t help thinking at the back of your 
mind, “hmm, that might be my one chance of having a baby and I‟ve given it away 
for this research” „ (IVF6.2:351-96).  
 
Another, less sanguine, woman described how her understanding of this possibility 
emerged as she went through treatment and then reflected afterwards. Referring to the 
early stages of the IVF process she said, „… at that stage it all seemed fairly straight 
forward to me. The only time I found it much harder was when there was a fertilised 
egg that they couldn‟t freeze, and that‟s when I thought, I wasn‟t happy with it at that 
stage … that possibility had not occurred to me – that you‟d have a viable embryo that 
they would not freeze … that wasn‟t covered particularly well and that‟s the bit 
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afterwards I said to [partner] that I didn‟t feel happy with that particular situation 
because that theoretically was just as viable as the ones they put in‟. She later said, 
„I‟d never thought of that possibility … I didn‟t know how I was going to feel about 
anything to be honest, and it was all very, very new … I was prepared for every other 
step of not getting enough eggs, or not getting any fertilised eggs, but I wasn‟t 
actually prepared for that step of having to throw one away‟. She reflected on how 
much harder the situation would have been if she had not got pregnant. Later she 
made her point more strongly: „I felt differently about donating the viable embryo … 
because the way I felt it had been worded was, or how I understood it, was all the 
viable ones would be frozen and I‟d obviously not understood that that might not 
happen. The non-viable embryos that weren‟t suitable for freezing and the eggs that 
didn‟t fertilise, I had no problems with, but as I say, the viable embryo, yes I did‟. She 
returned to this later in the interview, „I don‟t think I had really appreciated the 
emotional aspect of [long pause] the emotional aspect of, wasting my own eggs, if 
you see what I mean? That, that was a loss …‟(IVF14:130-591). It is interesting to 
note that this couple were pregnant at the time of the interview so IVF had worked for 
them: pregnancy though did not eliminate the difficulties experienced with this 
process. 
 
This situation is different from that where interviewees speculate about the non-
transferred embryos that „might have worked‟. Here they are comparing one, two or 
three embryos that had at least as good a chance of working as those that were 
actually transferred. The already-challenging IVF process acquires an additional 
difficulty when patients realise that such good quality embryos might have gone to 
research instead, especially for those who would rather not dwell on what that 
research entails. (See below.) 
 
(e)  Treatment or research?  This led at least nine couples to question whether 
research was more important to the clinic than treatment (five of whom also expressed 
concerns about their troubling third embryos). Couples in this group said they felt that 
the research agenda was ever present, in the clinic and in the local and national media. 
One man said, „They explained everything about the treatment until they were happy 
that we understood what we were doing, then introduced this secondary part of it … 
about any products [embryos] that we give them, that can‟t be used for us, would we 
be happy and so on, it was always at the end of whatever we wanted to speak 
about…they had another agenda from what we had, but [we weren‟t in dispute] with 
one another. It was done well. It was done professional. In fact, out of all the hospitals 
and things like that that I deal with, they‟re easily the most professional that I‟ve ever 
seen‟ (IVF19:1452-70). 
 
Others were less positive: „Obviously the treatment you get is fantastic but I do 
believe, and I may be very, very, wrong on this, but I do believe that the [Senior 
Clinician] is very much into research and I think IVF [short pause] is a sideline for 
them. I don‟t think it‟s their priority. I may be wrong …‟ (IVF28:160-72). Another 
said, „Unfortunately it gives me the impression that the research was the priority and 
the IVF was just like the bread and butter part of it to fund the research. That‟s how I 
felt. And still do … So when I didn‟t get told about what happened to my embryos 
and my eggs, or your sperm, you do think, “were you just wanting to keep it for your 
research because is that the priority?” And I get a little bit annoyed when I talk about 
it‟ (IVF9:228-273). 
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The suggestion that embryos were kept back for research could be considered a 
serious allegation although such comments were usually made hesitantly or 
apologetically, accompanied by acknowledgements of the importance of research in 
general. Interviewees spoke of being reassured when they had raised such questions 
with clinic staff and also of there being „proper procedures‟, but doubts still lingered. 
One couple decided they would not consent to the research during their next cycle, 
wondering if their chances would be better: „not thinking that anything untoward was 
going on but we thought that if the option isn‟t there to use those embryos for research 
they might then decide they can be frozen. For all that they told us that that wasn‟t 
going to be possible, in our minds we wanted to give ourselves the best chance. We 
weren‟t saying that anything would happen but you do hear about these things that 
you just never think of that went on, years ago they‟re pinching baby parts and 
keeping them in jars … I mean that‟s pretty serious stuff … So we just wanted to give 
ourselves the best chance‟ (IVF43:892-966). 
 
(f)  Knowledge about research.  Those who assumed that their embryos had been used 
for research had little grasp of what that might entail. Some (eight couples) were not 
concerned since they regarded these embryos as „my throw away bits … it wouldn‟t 
upset me to think that somebody in a lab may be messing about and doing 
experiments with my throwaways, no, it really doesn‟t bother me‟ (IVF6.2:545-71). 
There was some hesitation in referring to embryos as waste material: one couple 
appeared to correct each other: he said, „I just got the impression that it was anything 
that was left over, wasn‟t it –‟, at which point his partner interrupted to say, „anything 
that was left‟ and he resumed with, „anything that was left was going to be used, yeah‟ 
(IVF36:581-92), as if the notion of „leftovers‟ was not appropriate.  
 
Others, however, were uncertain about how much they wanted to know about the 
research, some expressing quite strong discomfort about what had happened to the 
embryos. One woman said, „It‟s just enough to know that you‟ve left your egg or 
embryo and hopefully it will help, but I wouldn‟t want to know what was done to it 
… that would be what I‟ve given to help people but I wouldn‟t want to know what 
was done to it‟ (IVF7:347-63). Another said, „You‟d like to know if it was worth it, if 
there was some value taken out of them‟ but „… I wouldn‟t want to know exactly 
what they did with them…‟. When asked what she was hesitant about, the woman 
replied, „I can‟t put my finger on it … [short pause] because it‟s still part of you, isn‟t 
it … you wouldn‟t want to know specifically, would you?‟ (IVF38:392-457). 
 
 
Discussion 
Briefly summarising the above material we can see that the interviewees are 
preoccupied with IVF treatment and the request (and in most part the agreement) to 
donate is very much a secondary consideration. Addressing the central research 
question, it is clear that interviewees‟ views of the embryo are complex and dynamic, 
changing over the different stages of IVF. The calculus of conception means that 
initially all embryos are important but as measures of quantity and then quality 
emerge, they learn to focus their energies on those that have most potential to produce 
a baby. At that point, the other embryos are less important. On later reflection they 
realise that they do not know what happened to those other embryos and they find 
themselves unable to articulate easily just what they think of those non-transferred 
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embryos. There is evidence that interviewees sense that the embryos deserve special 
consideration (it does not „feel right‟ to label them „leftovers‟) and that the research 
itself could involve aspects they would rather not consider (this was said with 
particular strength by a couple who had become pregnant). However, the embryos that 
caused interviewees most concern were those that held value precisely because they 
might have been capable of producing a baby but went to research instead: the 
troubling third embryos. Their value to interviewees lay not in their inherent qualities 
as embryos but as potential (to become) babies. 
 
From this brief examination of data, we can see that interviewees operate with a 
complex system of embryo classification. First, there are „embryos‟ which represent 
the vital step of treatment without which no baby could result and which are therefore 
of enormous value. Once these are classified as apparently good or poor quality, 
perceptions shift, with patients‟ energies focussing on the „good‟ embryos. The „other 
embryos‟, at that stage, are not given individual attention; they are each one amongst 
many that hold no particular individual promise or even value – at that stage. On later 
reflection another sense of that non-transferred embryo (or embryos) emerges but 
during the treatment itself that embryo diminishes in importance. Attention shifts 
instead to „our embryos‟: that is, those that could be seen on the screen, that were 
transplanted and which might, or did, produce a pregnancy. Sometimes „our embryos‟ 
were frozen, if enough were produced, to be used for later attempts. The distress 
caused by the „troubling third embryo‟ is precisely because those good quality 
embryos that went to research should really have been amongst „our embryos‟, from 
the interviewees‟ point of view.  Finally, interviewees clearly held a version of „the 
embryo‟, the morally laden, but to them abstract, entity that they were aware was the 
subject of debate and which they felt deserved respect (hence the apologetic use of 
„leftovers‟). However this category of embryo, though not irrelevant, did not play a 
dominant role in their decision making.  
 
Therefore, interviewees‟ views differ from those who debate the moral status of the 
human embryo (from any position) since they start from a different framework of 
relevance, one that is dominated by the IVF context and experience. Arguments about 
potentiality and capacity can be found in their utterances (Haimes et al., 2008) but 
these are embedded in their calculations of quantity and quality, and good and bad 
embryos, rather than in a view of the inherent qualities of embryos per se. This 
embryo classification scheme suggests that debate about the acceptability of hESC 
research should be broadened beyond that of the moral status of the human embryo to 
encompass also the variable social status of embryos. These data also suggest that the 
moral and social status of embryo providers should be included in deliberations.  
 
The main weakness of this study is insufficient representation of those who 
completely refused to donate embryos to stem cell research. Previous studies have 
found variation in the numbers refusing. Bjuresten and Hovatta (2003) reported only 
8% of those asked refused, while a larger UK study found 46% refused (Choudhary et 
al. (2004)). Hug‟s (2008) review of the literature on decision-making about donation 
of embryos suggests that being at the beginning of treatment, not understanding  the 
purpose of research and having good quality embryos, all influence potential donors 
to refuse. However, these factors were also important to our interviewees, so they 
cannot be determinative of the final decision. We were able to elicit the views of only 
two refuser couples: in both cases they objected to what they saw as possible animal 
Haimes and Taylor 2009 
Page 13 of 17 
 
 
research rather than the treatment of the human embryo. Therefore it is likely that the 
views of those with a strong moral objection to either embryo experimentation and/or 
stem cell research are underrepresented here. Whilst it is less likely that strong 
opponents of embryology would use IVF at all, it is unclear whether refusers have 
particular objections to stem cell research. Other research suggests that access to 
„refusers‟, to elicit their reasons for non-donation, is often difficult so it might be that 
such people are „research refusers‟ in general. There are also tentative suggestions 
that refusers in these contexts are less trusting of either the institutions involved in the 
research or the explanations given for the research (Haimes and Whong-Barr, 2004; 
Haimes and Williams, 2006). This, together with the findings of Choudhary et al. 
(2004) may also explain the low overall response rate in our study. The relevance of 
such possibilities for the embryo provision context clearly needs further exploration. 
 
The strengths of this study lie in its original insights to the debates around the use of 
embryos for hESC research. First, this study focuses on the provision of fresh 
embryos, an aspect that has received little attention hitherto. Whilst there are several 
studies on the choices potential donors might make with their frozen embryos 
(Fuscaldo et al., 2007; de Lacey, 2007 a & b; Lyerly and Faden, 2007; Lyerly et al., 
2006; Leach Scully and Rehmann-Sutter, 2006; Voorhis et al., 1999) few have studied 
the particular considerations that arise when requests for donation to hESC research 
are made during the IVF process itself. A brief report of a Swedish study of the 
acquisition of fresh embryos for hESC research reported the „positive attitude‟ of 
donors (Bjuresten and Hovatta, 2003:1355) though that study had similar difficulties 
to ours in discovering why some patients refused. Also that study, though valuable as 
an early investigation in this field, lacks an in-depth understanding of donors‟ values 
and perceptions and does not explore the impact of combining IVF with requests to 
donate. Our study usefully provides both those elements. 
 
It has been argued that the „intensely pressured context in which women create eggs 
for IVF‟ (Cohen, 2000) has such an impact that requests for donation to research 
should only be made in relation to frozen embryos (McLeod and Baylis, 2007). The 
American Society for Reproductive Medicine Ethics Committee argued that „it is 
appropriate to use only spare embryos that have been frozen‟ whilst acknowledging 
that questions would arise about the possibility of using fresh embryos because of 
their potentially better quality (2002:959). However, studies on patients‟ decision 
making over the range of possible fates of their frozen embryos suggest that this raises 
many difficulties for patients (Fuscaldo et al., 2007) and is subject to change (Newton 
et al., 2007). De Lacey suggests that these problems could be resolved by making 
decisions about the futures of embryos before any are frozen. Our study contributes to 
her call to explore how this „moral reasoning could be facilitated‟ (2007b:1757). It is 
clear, though, that requesting only frozen embryos would not resolve all difficulties 
for embryo providers. 
 
Another valuable aspect of this study is the presentation, from the providers‟ point of 
view, of the complex detail in which they perceive embryos. It is not uncommon in 
earlier studies to suggest that patients think of the embryo as a child (for example, 
Laruelle and Englert, 1995; Nachtigall et al., 2005; Svendsen and Koch, 2008). 
However, our study adds greater depth to such observations and shows that the 
conceptual relationship between „embryo‟ and „child‟ is much more nuanced, subtle 
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and contextualised (and therefore variable) than such earlier claims allow (de Lacey, 
2007, a&b). 
 
A further contribution is the provision of in-depth empirical evidence to question the 
oft-used adjective of „spare‟ in relation to embryos. Whilst this has been raised 
conceptually (Holm, 1993; Svendsen and Koch, 2008) we now have evidence 
(particularly data on „the troubling third embryo‟) that donors‟ understandings of 
„spare‟ might not match that of clinicians, researchers or ethicists. Previous studies 
have tended to use this phrase rather loosely and variably. Evidence from our study 
suggests the need to have a very explicit discussion with potential donors about what 
this phrase actually means in practice in any particular setting, both in relation to fresh 
embryos and in relation to local freezing policies.  
 
These new insights into the debates on the uses of embryos for stem cell research 
suggest a number of conclusions and recommendations, on the question of whether it 
is ethically justifiable to ask IVF patients to donate fresh embryos. First, while 
requesting fresh embryos is not without its problems, it would appear that these 
interviewees regarded this as a reasonable request. There is some suggestion in data 
under the theme of „understandings of research‟ that interviewees did not grasp all the 
details of the projects they were contributing to, such as the issue of immortality of 
stem cell lines, but that could be an objection raised about any request to contribute to 
hESC research, not whether embryos are fresh or frozen. 
 
However a second conclusion is that requests for fresh embryos should not be made in 
a patient‟s first cycle of IVF. Whilst there were no overt objections to the research 
request itself many interviewees raised the issue of how stressful and busy IVF is, 
particularly in the first cycle when „so much is going on‟ and it is all very unfamiliar 
to the couple. Combining this sense of confusion and stress with the data above on the 
variability of patients‟ views of the embryo as they go through the different stages of 
IVF, suggests that patients need to experience one full cycle, and thus experience this 
variability, before they can fully appreciate what it might mean to them to provide an 
embryo for research. Delaying the request until the second cycle also improves the 
patients‟ chances of fully understanding the different possible definitions of „spare 
embryos‟. In short, waiting until the second cycle improves the chances of consent 
being more fully informed and being based on experience as well as on counselling 
and documentation (Manson and O‟Neill, 2007). This delay also provides some of the 
distance that proponents of only asking for frozen embryos suggest is needed to 
ensure patients make autonomous decisions, whilst avoiding some of the additional 
problems associated with decision making over frozen embryos. Adopting such a 
strategy would also be an effective response to those patients who question the 
priorities of IVF clinics involved in stem cell research. 
 
Several questions arising from this study would benefit from further consideration. 
For example, now that embryo donation is more widespread, how do these findings 
from a UK clinic compare to those in other countries? Some comparative work has 
already been conducted (Leach Scully and Rehmann-Sutter, 2006; Haimes et al., 
2008) and more is being explored, for example in China (Mitzkat et al. 2009) and 
elsewhere, through an international network of studies on providers‟ perspectives. 
Also this and other studies very usefully establish the importance of exploring donors‟ 
perspectives and experiences, and establish the importance of women‟s reproductive 
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labour in global tissue economies (Cohen, 2000; Waldby and Cooper, 2008). 
However, it remains unclear just what weight such aspects are, or should be, given in 
the policymaking process in these areas.  
 
What is clear though is that this study adds to our understanding of the wider social 
implications of stem cell science. Much of the socio-ethical material on hESC science 
hitherto either addresses the therapeutic end goals of such work or the moral status of 
the embryo. This article opens up for discussion the „black box‟ of the provision of 
embryos and gives us greater insight to a key early point in the process of hESC 
research, without which progress would be very slow indeed. 
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